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How Will Welfare Recipients
Fare in the Labor Market!
Sheldon Danziger and Jeffrey Lehman
The proposed welfare
reform programs in
Congress are not
accompanied by jobs
programs. How will welfare
recipients fare in the job
market? The authors present
new research that shows
most welfare recipients will
probably not be able to
climb out of poverty.
SHELDON DANZIGER is Professor of So-
cial Work and Public Policy at the University
of Michigan and Faculty Associate at the
Population Studies Center. JEFFREY
LEHMAN is Professor of Law and Public
Policy and Dean of the Law School at the
University of Michigan. David Dickinson
provided expert computational assistance.
The President and Congresshave ignored what has beenlearned from the research of
the last decade about the labor mar-
ket in general, especially the state of
employer demand for less-skilled
labor, and about the employment
prospects of welfare recipients in
particular. The President's Work
and Responsibility Act, introduced
in June 1994, at least had a chance
to "end welfare as we know it,"
without harming many recipients. It
would have placed a time limit on
cash assistance, but would also have
provided increased education, train-
ing, and child care services in an
attempt to transform the welfare
poor into the working poor and ide-
ally then into the working near-poor
(either through their moving up to
higher wages and/or through in-
creased earned income tax pay-
ments, child care credits, etc.). The
Act might have accomplished its
goals through its increased govem-
ment spending and its offer of sub-
sidized employment to welfare re-
cipients who exhausted their eligi-
bility for cash assistance and were
actively, albeit unsuccessfully,
searching for regular jobs. In other
words, it would have replaced the
cash welfare safety net with a "work
for wages" safety net. What is im-
portant is that the entitlement for
destitute recipients remained—
their cash assistance could not have
been terminated if the govemment
did not offer some work opportu-
nity for jobless recipients who were
willing to work. In contrast, the Re-
publican Congress has sought to re-
duce welfare spending, eliminate
the entitlement to cash assistance
by converting Aid for Dependent
Children into a block grant, and pro-
vide no work option for those who
seek work but cannot find a job.
Recent research suggests that
many welfare recipients will not
fare well in the labor market be-
cause the past two decades have
been characterized by economic
distress for the middle class, the
working poor, and the unemployed,
as well as for welfare recipients.
There has been relatively little eco-
nomic growth over the past genera-
tion, and the gains from growth
have been uneven. In the two dec-
ades following World War II, "a
rising tide lifted all boats." During
economic recoveries most families
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gained—the poor as well as the rich, the less-skilled
as well as the most-skilled. During the recovery of the
1980s, however, a rising tide became an "uneven tide,"
as the gaps widened between the rich and the poor and
between the most-skilled workers and the least-skilled
workers.^
Economic hardship is now remarkably widespread.
Popular portrayals of economic hardship tend to focus
on inner-city poverty, single-mother families, or dis-
placed factory workers, and attribute poverty primar-
The ^^welfare problem'^ is part of a
broader '^poverty problem,'' which, in
turn, is part of a broader economy-wide
problem that has resulted from two
decades of slow economic growth and
rising inequalities. In effect, the
economy has generated new welfare
cases faster than an unevenly growing
economy and existing government
programs have reduced the need for
assistance.
ily to their behavior or their lack of work effort or
skills. But since the 1980s, inequalities have increased
within most socioeconomic groups as well. While
white-collar workers fared better on average than
blue-collar workers, and married-couple families
fared better on average than mother-only families,
many white-collar workers and many workers in mar-
ried-couple families were also laid off or experienced
lower real earnings.
Not even the most educated groups were spared. To
be sure the average college graduate continues to eam
substantially more than less-educated workers, and the
earnings of the average college graduate grew much
faster than the earnings of other workers in the 1980s.
Nonetheless, a college degree no longer guarantees a
high salary. In 1991, among 25- to 34-year-old college
graduates (without post-college degrees), 16 percent
of men and 26 percent of women worked for some time
during the year but earned less than the poverty line
for a family of four persons.^
Because economic hardship is this extensive, one
should be suspicious of claims that any welfare reform
bill debated in Congress can turn most welfare recipi-
ents into self-sufficient workers. The "welfare prob-
lem" is part of a broader "poverty problem," which, in
turn, is part of a broader economy-wide problem that
has resulted from two decades of slow economic
growth and rising inequalities. In effect, the economy
has generated new welfare cases faster than an un-
evenly growing economy and existing government
programs have reduced the need for assistance.
The primary source of increased economic hardship
has been a set of structural changes in the labor market.
Less-educated workers have found it harder to secure
employment, and those who are hired tend to receive
low wages. Many factors moved the economy in the
same direction. The decline in the size of the unionized
work force, reductions in the percentage working in
manufacturing, increased global competition, and the
consequent expansion of the import and export sectors
all lowered the wages of less-skilled workers. The
automation that accompanied the introduction and
widespread use of computers and other technological
innovations also increased demand for skilled person-
nel who could run more sophisticated equipment. Si-
multaneously, there was a decline in the demand for
less-skilled workers, who were either displaced by the
automated systems or had to compete with overseas
workers producing the rising imports.
These changes in the general structure of the labor
market have important implications for the current
welfare reform debate. Because most welfare recipi-
ents have limited education and labor market experi-
ence, the contemporary economy offers them dimin-
ished prospects even when unemployment rates are
low. Moreover, in many communities the unemploy-
ment rate has exceeded 6 percent for most of the past
15 years; in many inner cities, the unemployment rate
has remained well above 10 percent for this period.
The shift in the skill mix required in today's economy
means that, even if an employer extends a job offer to
a welfare recipient with low skills and experience, that
employer is not likely to pay very much.
It is simply not the case that most of today's welfare
recipients could obtain stable employment that would
lift them and their children out of poverty, if only they
would try harder. Fear of destitution is a powerful
incentive to survive; it will not, however, guarantee
that an unskilled worker who actively seeks work will
be able to eam enough to support his or her family.
The harsh realities of the labor market mean that
increased incentives for welfare mothers to search for
work—such as time-limited welfare benefits—are un-
likely to make much of a difference in their eamings
unless they are accompanied by increased employ-
ment opportunities.
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Figure 1. Predicted Annual Earnings for Selected Weifare iVIothers
(all are assumed U.S.-born, living in a central city, with no disabilities)
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WHAT CAN WELFARE RECIPIENTS
EXPECT TO EARN WHEN
WELFARE ENDS?
We now tum to some empirical estimates of the labor
market prospects for current welfare recipients. We
began with the Public Use Microdata Sample from the
1990 Census of Population and drew a sample of
single mothers between the ages of 18 and 45 who
resided in the 77 largest metropolitan areas.^ Single
mothers are defined as women who had at least one
child under the age of 18 living with them and who did
not have a husband residing in the same household.
Compared to the average single mother who does
not receive welfare, the typical welfare recipient has
less education, is younger, has more children and is
more likely never to have married. For example, about
one-quarter of nonrecipients, but half of recipients,
never married; about one-fifth of nonrecipients, but
more than two-fifths of recipients, lack a high school
degree; about one-sixth of nonrecipients, but one-
quarter of recipients, are below 25 years of age; about
one-sixth of nonrecipients, but one-third of recipients,
have three or more children.
All of these observed characteristics suggest that
welfare recipients, ceteris paribus, are likely to have
lower expected earning capacities than nonrecipients.
Regression analysis confirms this suggestion.
We began by considering only those single mothers
who did not receive welfare but who reported eamings
during 1989 (19,060 out of the 21,756 sample). We
regressed the natural logarithm of their annual eam-
ings on a set of demographic characteristics. For each
model we estimated separate regressions for single
mothers who are white non-Hispanic, black non-
Hispanic, Hispanic, or other non-Hispanic. We then
used the resulting set of regression coefficients to
estimate for each of the 7,821 welfare recipients how
much she would eam on average if she eamed what
observationally identical working single mothers
eamed.
Next, we estimated a second model, in which the
dependent variable was the probability that the single
mother eamed less than the poverty line for a family
of three persons ($9,885 in 1989). The sample for this
model included all 21,756 single mothers who did not
report any welfare income—2,696 who reported no
eamings and 19,060 who reported eamings in 1989.
Thus, this model reflects both the probability that a
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Figure 2. Probability of Earning iMore Than the Poverty Line for a Famiiy of Three
Selected Single-Mother Families with Two Children in Central City, Detroit
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single mother worked and her annual eamings. We
then used the second set of regression coefficients to
estimate for each welfare recipient the predicted prob-
ability that she would eam more than the poverty line
for a family of three.
Examples of our estimates for welfare recipients
with specific demographic characteristics are pre-
sented in Figures 1 and 2, for mean annual eamings
and the probability of eaming more than the poverty
line, respectively. There is reason to think that these
estimates overstate the potential eamings of recipients
because they might actually work fewer hours or eam
a lower hourly wage than observationally identical
working single mothers. This would occur if recipients
differed not only in the observed characteristics in-
cluded in the regression, but also in their unobserved
characteristics. For example, consider two never-mar-
ried single mothers with two children, neither of whom
is a high school graduate. If one worked because she
was more motivated or more skilled than the other who
received welfare, then our estimates, which do not
account for motivational or skill differences other than
years of completed schooling, will be too high.
Economist Gary Burtless, using data from the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth, finds that the
Armed Forces Qualification test scores of most young
welfare recipients place them in the bottom quarter of
all test-takers in their own age group. In addition, the
age-eamings profile rose more slowly for welfare
recipients than for nonrecipients as the cohort aged
over the 1980s. This suggests that our predicted eam-
ings levels are overstated, as are the "age" effects we
estimate.'*
Nonetheless, our results, even if biased upwards,
suggest that the typical welfare recipient will have
great difficulty in the labor market. Whereas the aver-
age eamings for working single women was $18,215
in 1989, our model predicts that the average welfare
recipient could have eamed only about $13,000. Even
more important, as Figure 1 shows, there is a wide
variation in predicted eamings depending on the char-
acteristics of the welfare mother. The figure presents
predicted eamings for a native-bom welfare mother
with no disabilities who resides in Atlanta, Detroit,
Los Angeles, or New York. The lowest eamers, shown
in the left-most part of the figure, with predicted
eamings below $7,000, are black, young, never-mar-
ried women who have not completed high school. As
we proceed to the right, predicted eamings are sub-
stantially higher for women between the ages of 26
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and 35 than they are for those between the ages of 18
and 25, and substantially higher for high school gradu-
ates than for high school dropouts. Race differences
are smaller—in Atlanta and Los Angeles, white
women have higher predicted eamings, but in Detroit
and New York they have lower predicted eamings.
The second regression predicts that only 41.5 per-
cent of the welfare mothers would eam more than the
poverty line for a family of three in 1989, compared
to 64.3 percent ofthe nonrecipient single mothers who
eamed that much. Figure 2 also shows wide variation
in the probability that a native-bom, nondisabled wel-
fare mother living with two children in Detroit would
eam more than $9,885, as we vary her race, education,
age, and marital status. For example, at the left of the
figure, 72.1 percent of divorced or separated white
women, between the ages of 36 and 45, with two
children over the age of six, and who are high school
graduates, are predicted to earn more than the poverty
line. Each of the subsequent bars varies one charac-
teristic, yielding a race effect of 5.2 percentage points,
a high school diploma effect of 21.6 points, a "middle
age" effect of 8.5 points, a marital status effect of 9.3
points, and a "young age" effect of 19.2 points. Thus,
only 8 percent of black, never-married mothers who
are between the ages of 18 and 25 and lack a high
school diploma are predicted to eam enough to avoid
poverty.
The 1991 termination of the General Assistance
(GA) program in Michigan also offers some informa-
tion on the difficulty that less-skilled individuals have
in finding employment. Among male and female for-
mer GA recipients who were under the age of 40 and
who had not qualified for disability benefits by 1993
when they were interviewed, about two-thirds had
worked at some time in the two years following their
termination. But at the time of the interview, only
about one-quarter of those with less than a high school
degree and one-half of those with a high school degree,
a GED, or more were working. The mean eamings of
the two groups were, respectively, $377 and $596 per
week. This sample, as do our regression results, sug-
gests that welfare recipients will have difficulty ob-
taining and maintaining jobs.
It is precisely because President Clinton's original
Work and Responsibility Act would have provided an
employment opportunity to those seeking but not find-
ing work that we found it attractive. The bill that
passed the Senate this past fall, the Work Opportunity
Act, however, did not address these labor market
problems.
It is difficult to understand the title of the Senate
bill. Nothing in it addresses the labor market problems
we have documented. Our regression analysis has
suggested that far fewer than half of all welfare moth-
ers have characteristics that would enable them to eam
their way out of poverty without help. And for black
never-married mothers between the ages of 18 and 25
who lack a high school diploma, the figure is fewer
than 10 percent.
The most that could be said for the Work Opportu-
nity Act was that it preserved more child care funding
than the House version of the legislation. But as im-
portant as child care is, it is not sufficient by itself to
create jobs where none exist. When an employer wants
to hire a potential worker, child care may make it
It is surely possible that the Work
Opportunity Act reflects nothing more
complicated than the narrow
self-interest of a group that does not
identify with people who collect
means-tested benefits.
possible for the worker to accept the offer. But child
care alone will do nothing to increase employers'
willingness to hire people whom they do not want to
hire.
At the same time that the WOA would fail to create
new work opportunities, it would systematically re-
duce the number of children receiving federal aid by
making them ineligible for benefits.
We do not know what kind of welfare reform, if any,
is politically feasible in 1996. But the rationale under-
lying the Work Opportunity Act is disturbing. Perhaps
it simply reveals an astonishing degree of faith in the
power of "shock therapy." Since the empirical evi-
dence directly contradicts the view that welfare moth-
ers could all find work if only they tried harder,
perhaps the WOA's supporters believe that the pros-
pect of starvation will offer a historically unprece-
dented spur to entrepreneurial innovation.
Altematively, one might say that the WOA reflects
a sense of deep despair and desperation about the
future of America's poor children. Supporters of the
WOA might believe that children bom out of wedlock
pose such a grave threat to American society that we
must take big chances, to make dramatic use of the
symbolic power of govemment, in an effort to change
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the behavior of individuals. They might even believe
we should not invest too much energy in worrying
about whether such dramatic moves injure some truly
blameless mothers and children along the way.
A third rationale for the Work Opportunity Act is
simpler, and more disturbing still. The WOA includes
a broad range of proposals for changes in the American
welfare state. In addition to the AFDC restrictions, it
would deny government benefits and services to legal
resident aliens, would slash funding for the Food
Stamps program, and would restrict eligibility for
Supplemental Security Income. The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that the Act would reduce
federal spending by $65 billion over the first seven
years. It is surely possible that the Work Opportunity
Act refiects nothing more complicated than the narrow
self-interest of a group that does not identify with
people who collect means-tested benefits.
Whatever the actual personal motivations of the
proponents of the legislation, its consequences are
clear. It would significantly increase hardship and
absolve government of numerous responsibilities that
it now attempts to fulfill. The president was correct to
veto the welfare bill that reached his desk in early
January.
NOTES
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College graduates do fare much better that high school graduates.
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